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Abstract—Smart grid, equipped with modern communication
infrastructures, is subject to possible cyber attacks. Particularly,
false report attacks which replace the sensor reports with fraud
ones may cause the instability of the whole power grid or even
result in a large area blackout. In this paper, a trustiness system
is introduced to the controller, who computes the trustiness of
different sensors by comparing its prediction, obtained from
Kalman filtering, on the system state with the reports from
sensor. The trustiness mechanism is discussed and analyzed for
the Linear Quadratic Regulation (LQR) controller. Numerical
simulations show that the trustiness system can effectively combat
the cyber attacks to smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, smart grid has attracted significant interest
in both communities of communications and power systems
[3]. In a smart grid, modern communication technologies are
used to convey information like system parameters (voltage,
frequency, harmonics, etc) and power consumption informa-
tion in order to improve the robustness, agility and efficiency
of power grid. For example, as illustrated in Fig. 1, phasor
measurement units (PMUs) send report to the power plant
which takes actions to stabilize the power grid.
However, the communication infrastructure also brings vul-
nerability to the smart grid. An attacker can attack the com-
munication links using various approaches such as jamming
in the physical layer and Byzantine attack in the upper layers.
The attack could result in delay or drop of report packets. The
attacker may revise the report such that the received report
is wrong, thus possibly incurring system instability and even
large area blackout which brings the loss of millions of dollars.
Therefore, a secure design of smart grid is in a pressing need.
In this paper, we study the trustiness framework based
secure control in smart grid. We assume that each report could
be substituted by a false report from an attacker1. Instead
of studying the security protocols in the communication net-
works, which has been intensively studied for data networks
like Internet, we focus on the controller side, i.e., the power
plant, which is aware of possible attacks. The controller can
predict the future system state and then evaluate the trustiness
of reports from different PMUs. Based on these trustiness, the
controller takes a corresponding control strategy, e.g., dropping
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1For the packet delay or loss, many techniques have been developed in the
area of networked control, e.g., the LQR control subject to packet losses [8].
Fig. 1: An illustration of the secure control system in smart
grid.
untrusted packets. The trustiness will also be fed back to the
PMUs such that the PMUs can adjust their security setups
(e.g., the keys or the cryptography protocols). The system is
illustrated in Fig. 1. For example, the reports from PMU A
is attacked by the attacker. Then, the trustiness of the reports
from PMU A is reduced, which may make the controller drop
the corresponding reports. Meanwhile, PMU A may change
its key or use a more secure protocol when it finds out that
its trustiness has been significantly decreased.
Note that the reliability issues for control systems have
been considered in supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) standard [10]. However, SCADA is mostly fo-
cused on the reliability subject to random failures, instead
of malicious attacks. There are some studies on the control
systems subject to malicious attacks [2] [4] [5]. [4] and [5]
introduce general problems and approaches for secure control
without exploring the details. [2] is focused on the control
system subject to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, thus mainly
addressing the packet delays or losses. There have not been
any studies on combating the proofing attacks, particularly,
applying the trustiness framework in the secure control.
Note that the trustiness system has been widely used in
information systems, e.g., [6] [11]. However, they are not
designed for control systems. The unique system dynamics of
the control system can be exploited to build the corresponding
effective trustiness. In this paper, we apply Kalman filtering
[9] to predict the system state using different combinations
of PMU reports, thus realizing a cross-check of the report
trustiness.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
2system model of the controller and communication infrastruc-
ture is introduced in Section II. A mechanism of evaluating the
trustiness of different PMUs is proposed in Section III. The
numerical simulation results and conclusions are provided in
Sections IV and V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first introduce the linear system model
for power grid. Then, we explain the LQR criterion of the
control.
A. Linear System
We model the dynamics of power grid as a discrete-time
linear system2, whose dynamics are given by
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +w(t),
y(t) = Cx(t) + n(t), (1)
where x is an N -vector and represents the system state of the
power grid, y is an M -vector representing the observations
and u is the action taken by the controller. The matrices
A, B and C are specified by the system. Both w(t) and
n(t) are Gaussian noise. For simplicity, we suppose that each
dimension of the observation vector y is sensed by a PMU.
It is easy to extend to the general case in which the sensor
reports have overlaps. Each PMU sends its observations to
the controller via a communication channel since they are not
located at the same place as the controller.
We use the following assumptions throughout the paper:
• Each report can be successfully received by the controller
if there is no attack. This is reasonable for communica-
tion channels with good qualities. For the practical case
of occasional packet drop, the control strategy can be
obtained by considering the corresponding element in the
observation matrix C as zero.
• Each report could be replaced with a false report by
an intervening attacker. The attacker could intercept the
report and insert its own one. However, we assume that
not all reports are replaced.
• For simplicity, we assume that there is at most one
attacker. The principle of the trustiness system can be
extended to the case of multiple attackers at the cost of
more computational cost.
B. LQR Control
When there is no attacker, we assume that the controller
adopts the LQR control [7] with an infinite time horizon with
the cost function given by
J = E
[
∞∑
t=1
βt
(
xT (t)Qx(t) + uT (t)Pu(t)
)]
, (2)
where Q and P are positive definite matrices. The physical
meaning of the objective function is given below:
2Although power grid is usually nonlinear, it can be approximated by a
linear system in the small perturbation case.
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Fig. 2: An illustration of the Kalman filtering based trustiness
evaluation.
• The term xT (t)Qx(t) is the norm (with respect to the
positive definite matrix Q) of the system state vector.
• The term uT (t)Pu(t) is the norm of the action vector
with respect to the matrix P, which represents the cost
due to the action itself.
Based on the cost function in (2), the LQR action u(t) is
given by
u(t) = −Lxˆ(t), (3)
where xˆ(t) is the estimation of the system state fed back from
a state estimator which will be explained later, and
L =
(
BTSB+P
)−1
BTSA, (4)
and the matrix x satisfies the algebraic Riccati Equation, which
is given by
S = AT
(
S− SB
×
(
BTSB+P
)−1
BTS
)
A+Q. (5)
III. TRUSTINESS EVALUATION
In this section, we propose a mechanism for evaluating
the trustiness of each sensor. The essential reason that the
controller can evaluate the trustiness of each sensor is that the
controller can predict the future state with some uncertainty.
If the report from a sensor is significantly deviated from the
prediction, then the controller can consider this sensor as
unreliable and ignores its reports. The basic principle is to
evaluate the trustiness of each PMU by comparing its report
with the prediction obtained from the reports of other N − 1
PMUs. The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2.
A. System State Prediction
In each time slot, the controller can predict the system state
in the next time slot, i.e., x(t+1), according to its own action
u(t) and the current system state x(t). Since it is possible that
there is one attacker, the controller computes N predictions by
excluding one sensor in each prediction.
The Kalman filtering can be applied for the system state
estimation. According to [9], the system state x(t + 1) is
3Gaussian distributed. When the observation yn from PMU n
is excluded, the expectation of the system state is given by
xn(t+ 1|t) = Atx
n(t|t), (6)
where
xn(t|t) = xn(t|t− 1) +Kn(t) (y −Cnx(t|t− 1)) , (7)
where Cn is obtained by removing the n-th row from the
observation matrix C, and
Kn(t) = Σ(t|t− 1)
(
CnΣn(t|t− 1) (Cn)T + σ2nI
)−1
, (8)
and covariance matrix given by
Σn(t|t) = Σn(t|t− 1)−KntC
n(t)Σ(t|t− 1), (9)
where
Σn(t+ 1|t) = AΣn(t|t)AT +BQBT . (10)
B. Trustiness Computation
Using the prediction obtained from the reports of PMUs
except PMU n, the a posteriori probability of yn(t), i.e.,
p(yn(t)|y−n(0 : t)) (here y−n means the observations ex-
cluding that of PMU n), is Gaussian distributed with the
expectation given by
un(t) = cnx
n(t|t), (11)
where cn is the n-th row in matrix C, and variance
σn(t) = cnΣ
n(t|t)cTn . (12)
We denote by Tn the type of PMU n. Tn = A if PMU n is
an attacker; otherwise Tn = H . Then, we define the suspicious
level of PMU n as the following conditional probability, which
is given by
pin(t) , P (Tn = A|y(0 : t)). (13)
The trustiness can be defined as 1− pin(t).
The challenges for computing the suspicious level is the
unknown attacking strategy3. We first assume that there must
be an attacker. Using the Bayesian rule, we have
pin(t) =
P (y(0 : t)|Tn = A)∑N
m=1 P (y(0 : t)|Tm = A)
=
1
1 +
∑
m 6=n
P (y(0:t)|Tm=A)
P (y(0:t)|Tn=A)
≈
1
1 +
∑
m 6=n
∏
t
s=0
P (y(s)|Tm=A)∏
t
s=0
P (y(s)|Tn=A)
, (14)
where the last approximation is obtained by decomposing
the joint distribution into the product of the probabilities in
each time slot. Note that this approximation is not rigorous.
However, it simplifies the computation and the validity will
3It is possible that an attacker is captured and the strategy is known to the
defender side. However, such an assumption is too strong for most systems.
be demonstrated in the numerical simulations. We do the
following further simplification:
P (y(s)|Tn = A) ≈ P (yn(s)|Tn = A)∏
k 6=n
P (yk(s)|Tk = H), (15)
by assuming the independence among the PMUs. Although
this assumption does not hold, it simplifies the analysis. We
further assume that P (yn(s)|Tn = A) is a constant since we
have no knowledge about the attacker’s strategy. Substituting
the approximation in (15) into (14), we obtain
pin(t) ≈
∏t
s=0
1
P (yn(s)|Tn=H)∑N
m=1
∏t
s=0
1
P (ym(s)|Tm=H)
. (16)
We then approximate the probability P (yn(s)|Tn = H) by
N (un(t), σn(t)).
When it is possible that there is no attacker, it is easy to
repeat the above procedure and obtain the following approx-
imation for the suspicious level of PMU n, which is given
by
pin(t) ≈
∏t
s=0
1
P (yn(s)|Tn=H)
L+
∑N
m=1
∏t
s=0
1
P (ym(s)|Tm=H)
, (17)
where L represents the a priori likelihood that there is no
attacker, which is given by
L =
P (there is no attacker)
P (there is one attacker)
. (18)
Obviously, the large L is, the less sensitive the controller is to
possible attackers.
C. Secure Control Based on Trustiness
One approach to handle the attacker is to omit its reports
once determining that it is an attacker. Alternatively, we
propose a heuristic approach for the control based on the
trustiness values, called weighted prediction. Suppose that we
still use the LQR control. Then, the control action taken at
time t is given by
u(t) = −Lxˆ(t, {P (Tn = A|y)}n), (19)
where the system state estimation is a function dependent on
the suspicious levels of different PMUs. We set
xˆ(t, {P (Tn = A|y)}n) =
∑N
n=1 P (Tn = A)|y)xˆ
n(t)∑N
n=1 P (Tn = A)|y)
, (20)
where the estimation is the weighted sum of the system state
estimations of different excluded PMUs. When the suspicious
level of PMU n is high, the corresponding system state
estimation xˆn(t), which excludes the reports from PMU n,
will dominate (recall that xn(t) is obtained by excluding the
reports from PMU n).
D. Algorithm Summary
The proposed algorithms are summarized in Procedure 1.
4Procedure 1 Procedure of The Trustiness Computation and
Control
1: for Each time slot t do
2: for PMU n, n = 1, 2, ..., N do
3: Exclude the report from PMU n, i.e. yn(t).
4: Carrying out the Kalman filter for the observation with
yn(t) excluded.
5: Compute the expectation and variance using (11) and (12).
6: Compute the corresponding probability P (ym(s)|Tm =
H).
7: end for
8: Compute the suspicious levels.
9: Apply the weighted system state estimation for the LQR
control.
10: end for
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we use numerical simulations to demonstrate
the proposed trustiness system in smart grid.
A. Linear Model
We adopt the linear model analyzed in Example 6.2 of
[1], in which the system is described using the following
continuous-time linear dynamics:
x˙(t) = −M−1Kx−M−1u+w, (21)
where the matrix M is given by
M =

2.1 1.55 1.55 0 0 0 0
1.55 1.651 1.55 0 0 0 0
1.55 1.55 1.605 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2.04 1.49 0 0
0 0 0 1.49 1.526 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1786.9 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1


,
and the matrix K is given in (21) (at the top of the next
page). The details of the model can be found in [1].
Since we discuss the discrete-time model in this paper, we
approximate the continuous-time model by setting a small time
step ∆t, which is given by
x((n+ 1)∆t)− x(n∆t)
∆t
≈ −M−1Kx(n∆t)−M−1u(n∆t) +w(n∆t). (22)
Therefore, we assume the following discrete-time model:
x(n+ 1) =
(
I−∆tM−1K
)
x(n)
− ∆tM−1u(n) + ∆tw(n), (23)
where we ignore the step ∆t in the index.
We assume that the PMUs can observe the system state
directly, i.e., C = I, each PMU for one dimension. We further
assume that PMU 1 is malicious while all other PMUs are
honest.
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
time index
su
sp
ec
t v
al
ue
attacker
honest user 1
honest user 2
Fig. 3: The trace of suspicious level of the attacker and two
honest PMUs: random report case.
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Fig. 4: The trace of suspicious level of the attacker and two
honest PMUs: deliberate noise case.
B. Evolution of Suspicious Level
In Figures 3 and 4, the evolution of the suspicious level
is shown for the attacker and two honest PMUs. In Fig.
3, we assume that the report of the attacker is a Gaussian
random variable with zero mean and variance 0.1. The attacker
decides to attack or not to attack with probability 0.2 (called
attack frequency). We observe that there is some fluctua-
tion at the beginning. Then, at the times when the attacker
launches attacks, the suspicious level of the attacker increases
significantly. After around 80 time slots, the attacker can be
well distinguished from the two honest PMUs. In Fig. 4, we
assume that the attacker attaches a Gaussian noise with zero
expectation and variance 0.1 to the observation. The attack
frequency is increased to 0.5. We observe that the suspicious
level increases more smoothly.
C. Detection Delay and False Alarm
In Fig. 5, we plot the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
curves of the time when the controller claims that an attacker
is detected. We assume that the controller claims the attacker
when the suspicious level is larger than 0.7. The cases of false
alarms are excluded (note that a false alarm is defined as
5K =


0.0211 0 0 2.04 1.49 1.43 −1.025
0 0.0007 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.0131 0 0 0 0
−2.1 −1.55 −1.55 0.0211 0 −1.039 −1.397
0 0 0 0 0.054 0 0
−0.014 −0.362 −0.362 −1.428 −0.79 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0


. (21)
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Fig. 5: CDF curves of the time of claiming the detection.
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Fig. 6: ROC curves (detection delay and false alarm) for
different attack frequencies.
the event that a honest PMU is claimed to be an attacker).
We change the attack frequencies from 0.1 to 0.3. The linear
system runs for 200 time slots. We observe that, when the
attack frequency is 0.1, the attacker is not detected within the
200 time slots in around 40% cases. When the attack frequency
is increased, the attacker will be detected faster.
In Fig. 6, we plot the receiver operation characteristic (ROC)
curves, which show the average delay of detection (excluding
the false alarms) and false alarm rate. The attack frequencies
are 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. Again, we use the threshold of
0.7 for the suspicious level. Obviously, the detection delay
increases when the attack frequency becomes larger with a
fixed false alarm rate.
D. Comparison of Cost
In Figures 7 and 8, the cost averaged over 2000 time slots
and 100 realizations is shown. We assume that Q = I and
P = 0.01I in (2), i.e., we pay much more attention to the norm
of the system state. We compare the costs using the weighted
system state estimation in Section III and the system without
any counter measure for the attacker (i.e., full trust to each
PMU).
In our test, we found that a small amplitude attack (e.g., the
attacker uses the same attack as in Fig. 5) causes very small
impact on the system. This is because that the Kalman filter
has certain inherent robustness since the attack can be partially
mitigated by observations from other PMUs. Therefore, we
assume that the report of PMU1 is the sum of the original
report and a strong noise with a large variance, which is
called attack amplitude. In Fig. 7, we assume that the attack
amplitude is 100 and change the attack probabilities. We
observe that, as the attack probabilities increases, the average
cost of the full trust case is significantly increased. Meanwhile,
the total cost is decreased as the attack frequency increases. A
possible reason is that a higher attack frequency may cause
a more rapid degradation of the trustiness of the attacker.
The total cost is also shown for different attack amplitudes in
Fig. 8. Again, the total cost increases as the attack amplitude
is increased in the full trust case. In a contrast to Fig. 7,
the average cost of the weighted system state case is not a
monotonic function of the attack amplitude. The reason could
be: when the attack amplitude is small, the attacker causes
little damage to the system; when the amplitude is large, the
controller can detect the attacker early and avoid the cost in
later time slots.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have analyzed the possible spoof attack
on the smart grid system, in which the attacker can intercept
and true report and send its faked report to the controller,
which can cause severe damage to the power grid. We have
proposed a trustiness system for the controller, in which
multiple Kalman filtering processes, with each PMU excluded,
are used to cross check the suspiciousness of each PMU. The
suspicious levels are then used as weights for the system state
estimation for the LQR control. Numerical simulations have
shown that the attacker can be effectively detected and the
weighted system prediction approach significantly outperforms
the system unaware of possible attacks.
Our future work includes the following aspects:
• The multiple attacker case.
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Fig. 8: The average cost versus different attack amplitudes.
• The optimal attack strategy of the attacker against the
proposed trustiness system.
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